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BLA CKMER V. BLA CKMER: THE PRESUMPTION OF
UNDUE INFLUENCE IN MONTANA
Christopher B. Swartley
I. INTRODUCTION
A properly executed will is presumed to be free from undue
influence, and the burden of proving that such influence existed
rests upon a contestant who alleges its existence.' However, most
jurisdictions now recognize a special exception to this rule when the
contestant can establish that a confidential relationship existed be-
tween the testator and the beneficiary, that the beneficiary actively
participated in the procurement or preparation of the will, and that
an unnatural disposition in favor of this beneficiary occurred. It is
generally held that the proof of these three elements will give rise
to a presumption of undue influence, requiring the proponent of the
will to come forward with rebutting evidence or lose his case.'
The Montana supreme court has rejected the existence of a
presumption of undue influence under this state's statutory
scheme, 3 and this rejection was recently reaffirmed in Blackmer v.
Blackmer.' Unfortunately, the facts upon which the court has based
its holdings do not fit the pattern usually accepted by courts and
commentators as giving rise to the presumption. Logic, public pol-
icy, and human nature all seem to demand the existence of such a
presumption, in order to protect the aging, gullible, or weak-minded
testator. This note is an attempt to demonstrate that in a proper
fact setting, a means may exist by which to avoid the harshness of
the holdings of the Blackmer line of cases.
1. 94 C.J.S. Wills § 237 (1956); see also In re Choinier's Estate, 117 Mont. 65, 156 P.2d
635 (1945).
2. 94 C.J.S. Wills § 239 (1956); 3 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS §§ 29.95-29.96 (1961);
see 13 A.L.R.3d 381 (1967).
3. Although located in the chapter concerning contracts, REVISED CODES OF MONTANA,
(1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 13-311 is accepted by the courts as applicable
to the law of wills:
Undue influence-in what it consists. Undue influence consists:
1. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is ieposed by another, or who holds a
real or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose
of obtaining an unfair advantage over him;
2. In taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind; or
3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's necessities or
distress.
R.C.M. 1947, § 91-103 dictates that: "A will . . . procured to be made by. . . undue influ-
ence, may be denied probate." It is noteworthy that neither of these sections is affected by
the Montana Uniform Probate Code, R.C.M. 1947, tit. 91A.
4. Blackmer v. Blackmer, - Mont. __, 525 P.2d 559 (1974).
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II. BLACKMER V. BLACKMER
Fannie Blackmer executed her first will in 1959, and her second
will, which was contested in the case, in 1969. Her son, a defendant
and the proponent of the second will, had taken her to see her
attorney, who had advised her to make the second instrument. Sub-
sequent to changing her will, Fannie had stated in the presence of
the attorney and all the legatees that "This is just the way I want
it." Nevertheless, an action was commenced to set aside the will on
the grounds of mental incompetence and undue influence.
At the trial, there was considerable dispute as to the facts of
the case, with one group of witnesses testifying to the testator's
neatness, care, intelligence, and decision-making ability, while an-
other group testified to her confusion, poor eyesight, difficulty con-
trolling her moods, and lack of business experience. The trial court
concluded that
. . . on December 29, 1969 . . . by reason of senility, her serious
condition and love of [defendants], Fannie I. Blackmer was sub-
ject to undue influence.'
2. That because Mrs. Blackmer was 85 years of age, frail in body,
nearly blind, dependent upon others for her well-being, inexperi-
enced in business affairs, and suffered from . . . senility, the na-
ture of the transaction and the reasons given therefor coupled with
the confidential relationship, gives rise to a presumption that the
will . . . [was] not freely, fairly and understandably made.'
The defendants appealed, and the Montana supreme court
framed the central issue as follows:
2. Does the court's conclusion of law No. 2 give rise to a presump-
tion of undue influence, or a presumption that a . . . will [was]
not understandably and freely made?7
The court concluded that
. . . these circumstances in Montana raise no presumption of any
kind. Undue influence. . . is never presumed and must be proven,
like any other fact. In re Cocanougher's Estate, 141 Mont. 16, 375
P.2d 1009.8
The following requirements were set forth as the minimum a con-
testant must establish to deprive a beneficiary of his legacy:
(1). Confidential relationship of the person attempting to influ-
ence the testator;
5. Id. at 561, 562.
6. Id. at 562.
7. Id. at 562.
8. Id.
1976]
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(2). The physical condition of the testator as it affects his ability
to withstand the influence;
(3). The mental condition of the testator as it affects his ability
to withstand the influence;
(4). The unnaturalness of the disposition as it relates to showing
an unbalanced mind or a mind easily susceptible to undue influ-
ence, and
(5). The demands and importunities as they may affect
particular testator taking into consideration the time, the place,
and all the surrounding circumstances.'
The court concluded that the mere fact that Fannie had lived
with the defendants for two years was insufficient to support the
plaintiff's contentions, since no additional proof had been offered to
show that the defendants had actually exercised undue influence on
the testator's mind to procure the execution of the will. The trial
court's holding was therefore reversed because it was not supported
by substantial evidence.
II. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE "No PRESUMPTION" RULE
The court in Blackmer cited both Hale v. Smith"° and In re
Cocanougher's Estate" for the proposition that undue influence is
never presumed in Montana but must be proven like any other fact.
As previously noted, the general rule in other jurisdictions is to the
contrary in the following situation:
Where one who unduly profits by the will as a beneficiary thereun-
der sustains a confidential relation to the testator, and has actually
participated in procuring the execution of the will, the burden is
on him to show that the will was not induced by coercion or fraud
a presumption of undue influence arises from proof of the
existence of a confidential relation between the testator and such
a beneficiary, coupled with activity on the part of the latter in
preparation of the will."
Upon close scrutiny, neither Hale, Cocanougher, nor Blackmer re-
veal facts which should have induced the court to apply the gener-
ally accepted rule. It is therefore arguable that the holdings in these
cases were too broad for the facts presented, and were thus merely
dicta.
In Hale v. Smith, the trial court did not find undue influence,
and the issue on appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence support-
9. Id., citing Estate of Maricich, 145 Mont. 146, 400 P.2d 873, 879 (1965).
10. Hale v. Smith, 73 Mont. 481, 237 P. 214 (1925).
11. In re Cocanougher's Estate, 141 Mont. 16, 375 P.2d 1009 (1962).
12. In re Estate of Graves, 202 Cal. 258, 259 P. 935 (1927).
[Vol. 37
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ing the holding. The court was impressed by several factors: the will
had been executed 2 1/2 years prior to the testator's death; the testa-
tor was a "unique and positive character . . . strong minded...
It was not easy for anyone to influence him. ..",; and the benefici-
aries were the natural objects of his bounty. The court found that
• ..the evidence conclusively shows the testamentary capacity of
the testator . . and that in making (the will) he was wholly free
from the undue influence of any person whomsoever.'4
It was thus unnecessary for the court to add, without citing any
authority, that
[Undue influence] is never presumed, and must be proven like
any other fact. The burden of proving it rests upon the contest-
ant. 5
Since there was not even a suggestion that the beneficiary was
in any way active in the procurement or preparation of the will or
that this beneficiary was an unnatural object of the testator's
bounty, the case was clearly one in which it would have been illogi-
cal to presume undue influence. In light of the testator's personality
and the long existence of the will, it was odd that the court stated
such a broad and general rule without citing any authority.
The facts of In re Cocanougher's Estate are similarly unsuited
to the application of the majority rule concerning presumptions of
undue influence. Although the trial court found undue influence on
the basis of a special interrogatory to the jury, the issue again con-
cerned the sufficiency of the evidence. The facts were clear: the will
had been executed 22 months prior to the testator's death; the will
was drafted and witnessed by an independent attorney; no benefici-
ary was present at the execution; the contestant actually dealt with
the decedent in business up to the time of death; the testator was
active and healthy at the time of execution; and most importantly,
the person who allegedly applied the undue influence did not even
know of the existence of the will until after the testator's death! On
the basis of these facts, especially the last one, the court held that
There was no evidence, or at the very most just a suggestion of
evidence, as to any undue influence being exercised, as the term
is used in our statutes and cases . . .
Citing extensively from Hale v. Smith, the court refused to follow
13. Hale v. Smith, supra note 10 at 214.
14. Id. at 215.
15. Id. at 216.
16. In re Cocanougher's Estate, supra note 11 at 1013.
19761
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the plaintiff's urging to adopt the California rule, 7 and again re-
jected any presumption in this area.
As in Hale v. Smith, the facts of this case did not fit the mold
generally accepted as the basis of the presumption. There was no
activity in the procurement of the will, the beneficiary was not an
unnatural object of the testator's bounty, and there was indepen-
dent advice by counsel to the testator.
Recalling the Blackmer case, in which the elements of active
participation and unnatural disposition were similarly lacking, it
can only be concluded that the rule against the presumption of
undue influence in Montana rests on three rather infirm holdings.
The court has guardedly recognized this infirmity on two occasions.
In declining to adopt the California rule in Cocanougher, the court
noted that the result would not be changed even if that line of cases
were followed." In In re Choiniere's Estate, the presumption, "if one
existed" was found to have been effectively rebutted. 9
Because the Montana rule is dicta, it is possible that in the
proper factual setting it might be abandoned. An argument based
upon the weight of authority in other jurisdictions" should be persu-
asive. An additional argument based on considerations of both pol-
icy and logic may aid in convincing the court to turn its back on past
dicta. An examination of the basis of the general rule highlights this
argument.
IV. THE BASIS OF THE PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE
Undue influences consists of the taking of an unfair advantage
of another by means of such persons's weakness of mind, or dis-
tressed condition, or by means of a special confidence or authority.2'
The theory underlying the doctrine of undue influence in the law of
wills is that
. . . the testator is induced, by the means employed, to execute
an instrument in form and appearance his will, but in reality ex-
pressing testamentary dispositions which he would not have volun-
tarily made . . .2
Special problems of proof will almost certainly be encountered when
attempting to show that unfair advantage was taken in the form of
17. See textual statement of the rule in connection with note 12, supra and additionally
In re Arnold's Estate, 16 Cal.2d 573, 107 P.2d 25 (1940); In re Haywood's Estate, 109 Cal.
App.2d 388, 240 P.2d 1028 (1952); In re Nelson's Estate, 134 Cal. App. 561, 25 P.2d 871 (1933).
18. In re Cocanougher's Estate, supra note 11 at 1014.
19. In re Choiniere's Estate supra note 1 at 639.
20. See discussion, supra note 2.
21. See discussion, supra note 3.
22. Murphy v. Nett, 47 Mont. 38, 130 P. 451, 453 (1913).
254 [Vol. 37
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an inducement, and also that the mental state of the deceased was
not what he expressed in his will. Such difficulties as the close
confidence of the testator and the will's proponent, the private na-
ture of the exercise of influence, the possibility of a lengthy series
of influential actions over an extended period of time, and the ab-
sence of clear information as to the actual intent of the deceased
place a heavy burden on the will contestant.
With these problems inherent in proving undue influence, it
seems incongruous to require the contestant to show any more than
the direct evidence that is always present in such cases: that the
testator and the beneficiary sustained a confidential relationship;
that the latter actively participated in the procurement of the will;
and that an unnatural bequest resulted from the activity. These
facts alone will be quite difficult to establish. The less mental ca-
pacity and will power the testator has (and thus the more
susceptible he is to influence), the easier it will be for the unscrupu-
lous to take advantage of him. As the influencing becomes easier,
the facts available to implicate the wrongdoer will become more
scarce. In the extreme case, very little effort could result in easily
overcoming the testator's intent, and in such a situation few facts
will exist upon which a contestant could base his case. A presump-
tion is demanded by logic to protect the weak-minded and aged, and
to provide for disposition of property according to the true intent of
the testator. The broad rule of the Blackmer case tends to lessen this
protection by imposing too severe a burden of proof on the party
attempting to expose the alleged wrongdoing.
A presumption of undue influence in this special situation may
not be the ultimate solution to these evidentiary problems, but it
offers a satisfactory compromise by forcing the proponent to come
forward with information which only he may possess. Whether the
presumption shifts the burden of proof or is merely used as another
factor by the jury in weighing the evidence,23 it results in easing the
task faced by the contestant in establishing the wrong, and may
actually discourage those attempting to work influence by providing
a barrier in an otherwise open area.
Conversely, because of the limited application and stringent
threshold requirements of the presumption, it should not result in
overturning wills which truely express the testator's intent. The rule,
ideally serves to protect the rights of the testator and the legitimate
beneficiaries, without causing hardship to any but those who take
23. 3 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS §§ 29.85, 29.96 (1961). Substantial disagreement
exists among other jurisdictions as to the effect of the presumption, although a shift in the
burden of proof seems to provide the best results.
19761
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unfair advantage. A proponent who is an intended beneficiary will
easily be able to rebut the presumption with competent evidence;
the undue influencer, by contrast, will find it difficult to overcome
the burden placed on him with credible, provable facts.
V. CONCLUSION
The Blackmer case and its precedents have laid down an ana-
molous rule in Montana by holding that no presumption of undue
influence exists in this state. The rule has no basis in authority or
logic and it is apparently unique. Furthermore, it is not supported
by the facts of the cases in which it was expounded. Fortunately, it
can be argued under the proper facts that the rule should be aban-
doned, both on the grounds that it is dicta and that it is illogical
and unfair in its results. Confusion and injury can only follow from
further adherence to the no presumption rule.
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